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I shall argue, in the course of this lecture, that the title I gave myself
is a bad one, one that sets a bad example. "Liberalism," like "conserva-
tism" and "socialism," is too local, contingent and shifting a term to
deserve a place in a general theory of society, politics, government and
law. So I had better say at once which proposition or set of propositions
I, on this occasion, was gesturing towards with the word "liberalism," out
of all the many propositions, often conflicting, which have been called
"liberal." What I had in mind was the thesis that government and law
should be limited in their range of application, that there are domains
which government and law should not enter and in which there is (to
use that excruciatingly imprecise dictum) a "right to be let alone".1 Any
sound theory of natural law will explain and justify the authority of
government as an authority limited (1) by positive law (especially but
not only constitutional law), (2) by the moral principles and norms of
justice which apply to all human action (whether private or public), and
(3) by the common good of political communities-a common good which
I shall argue is inherently instrumental and therefore limited. If
"limited government" is not a term widely used in natural law theories,
it is because it is so ambiguous. For the proper limits on government
and political authority are quite various in their kinds and their sources.
Nonetheless, being "limited" is only to a limited extent a desirable
* Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy, University of Oxford; Fellow of University
College, Oxford; Distinguished Visiting Professor, Boston College Law School, 1993-94;
Fellow of the British Academy.
1. THOMAS M. COOLEY, TORTS (2d ed. 1888), p.29; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,550 (1961) (Harlan
J., dissenting); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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characteristic of government: bad and powerful people and groups want
government limited so that they can bully and exploit the weak, or
simply enjoy their wealth untroubled by care for others. , So "limited"
cannot be a framework term, like "just."
I hope you will forgive me if I suggest that the thirteenth century
theologian Thomas Aquinas was the first theorist of government to
articulate as a specific concept the desideratum that governmental
authority/power be legally "limited." (But these questions of priority are
not to be taken too seriously). As a philosopher he began a commentary
on Aristotle's Politics, and on its first substantive page he gives an
explanation of a distinction which Aristotle at that point draws but does
not explain, the distinction between political and regal types of
government (regimen). In "regal" (kingly) forms of government, says
Aquinas, the rulers have plenary authority,2 while in "political," their
authority is "limited [coarctatal in accordance with certain laws of the
polity."3
Why limit the authority of rulers? Well, Aquinas's uncompleted
commentary ends before the passages where Aristotle discussed the
desirability of a "rule of laws and not of men."4 But in his commentary
on Aristotle's Ethics, at the point in Book I-V where Aristotle briefly
summarizes the merits of the rule of law,5 Aquinas expands and
perhaps deepens the summary a little: right government does not
tolerate an unregulated rule by rulers ("rule of men"), but calls for rulers
to be ruled by law, precisely because law is a dictate of reason, while
2. See also THOMAS AGVINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q.105 a.1 ad 2.
3. '... politicum autem regnum est quando ille qui praeest habet potestatem
coarctatam secundum aliquas leges civitatis": AQUINAS, IN LIBROS POLITICORUM
ARISTOTELIs ExposITo I, 1 (Marietti ed., 1951, n.13). In his DE REGIMINE PRINCPUM, I,
6, Aquinas states that where one person is ruler, that person'spower/authority should be
"limited" (temperetur potestas), lest it slide into tyranny (i.e. into government for private
rather than common good). Aquinas's distinction between regal and political rule is
enthusiastically taken up by Sir John Fortescue, THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND (c.1475),
c.1; likewise his DE NATURA LEGIS NATURAE ["On the nature of natural law") (c. 1462) c.16;
similarly his DE LAuDIBuS LEGUM ANGLIAE ["In praise of the laws of England"] (c.1469) cc.
2-4. Thence it finds its way into Coke and the mainstream of English constitutional
thought. The first editor of Sir John Fortescue's GOVERNANCE (Lord Fortescue of Credan,
when solicitor-general to the Prince of Wales, in 1714) titled the work "THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN AN ABSOLUTE AND LIMITED MONARCHY." In c.1 of the GOVERNANCE, as elsewhere
in his writings on this theme, Fortescue appeals to the authority of Aquinas, explicitly to
the DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM; there is, however, no evidence that he read Aquinas's
commentary on the Politics: see CHARLES PLUMMER (ed.), THE GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND
... BY SIR JOHN FORTESCUE... 172-3 (Oxford U.P., 1895).
4. E.g. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS III,10: 1286a9, etc.
5. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V,6: 1134a35-bl.
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what threatens to turn government into tyranny (rule in the interests of
the rulers) is their human passions, inclining them to attribute to
themselves more of the good things, and fewer of the bad things, than
is their fair share. And the commentary on the Politics suggests another
reason. Political (as opposed to despotic government) is the leadership
of free and equal people; and so the roles of leader and led (ruler and
ruled) are swapped about for the sake of equality, and many people get
to be constituted ruler either in one position of responsibility or in a
number of such positions.'
Such regular change-overs in political office-.standardly correlated
with electidns--obviously need to be regulated by the laws which
constitute (define) those offices; those who at any one time hold office
accordingly do so "according to law" (secundum statuta).8 The guiding
thought is: "free and equal." Indeed, in his own free-standing theological
works Aquinas will say that the best arrangement of governmental
authority (optima ordinatio principum) will include this, that "everyone
(omnes) shares in government, both in the sense that everyone is eligible
to be one of the rulers, and in the sense that those who do rule are
elected by everyone."9 And those who go beyond constitutional limits by
enacting ultra vires laws are thereby acting unjustly;'0 their action is
merely another way of getting more than their fair share (in this case,
of authority if of nothing else).
The account of the rationale and content of the Rechtsstaat or Rule of
Law, and thus of the point and scope of the legal limits on government,
has in subsequent centuries become somewhat ampler and more
detailed. However, like these early teachings of Aristotle and Aquinas,
later accounts enriched by historical experience and the reflections of
public lawyers properly pertain to natural law theory, in ways which I
hope to make a little clearer in what follows.
6. AQuINAs, IN LIBROS PoLTIcoRum ARISmiTEUS EXPOSITION , 5 (Marietti ed., 1951,
n.90): "politica est principatus liberorum et aequalium: unde communtantur personae
principantes et subiectae propter aequalitatem, et constituuntur etiam plures principatus
vel in uno vel in diversis officiis."
7. See ibid. n.152.
8. Id.
9. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-I, q.105 a.lc. On sharing in government as the
essence of citizenship, see AQUINAS, IN LIBROS POLITICORUM ARIsTOTELIs EXPOSITIO III, 1
(Marietti ed., i951, n.354).
10. This one form of unjust law (and so more a matter of violence than of law properly




Deeper and more demanding than any constitutional or other legal
limits on governments are the moral principles and norms which natural
law theory considers to be principles and norms of reason," and which
are limits, side-constraints, recognized in the conscientious deliberations
of every decent person. The public responsibilities and authority of
rulers do not exempt them from these limits:" no intentional killing of
the innocent; no rape; no lies; no non-penal enslavement, and so forth.
The reassertion of the truths that there are indeed such limits on
government, and that they can well be articulated in the relatively
modern language of truly inviolable rights, is one of the principal
teachings in the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor, and as, you may be
surprised to hear, the first attempt the highest teaching authority of the
Roman Catholic Church has ever made to "set forth in detail the
fundamental elements of Christian moral teaching."" The justification
of the traditional claim that these are truths which both pertain to
divine revelation and are accessible to reason unaided by revelation
would be matter for another lecture, or series of lectures. I have done
something towards that project in the last four chapters of my book with
Joseph Boyle and Germain Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and
Realism'4 and in my little more recent book Moral Absolutes. 5
Matter for another lecture would also be the claim made in the papal
letter that "the commandments of the second table of the Decalogue in
articular-those which Jesus quoted to the young man of the Gospel (cf
11. See PLATO, REPUBLIC IV, 444d; iX, 585-6 on acting according to reason and thus
according to nature. More explicitly, AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q.71 a.2c: "The
good of the human being is being in accord with reason, and human evil is being outside
the order of reasonableness .... So human virtue... is in accordance with human nature
just in so far as it is in accordance with reason, and vice is contrary to human nature just
in so far as it is contrary to the order of reasonableness."
12. "The same law of nature that governs the life and conduct of individuals must also
regulate the relations of political communities with one another ... Political leaders...
are still bound by the natural law ... and have no authority to depart from its slightest
precepts": JOHN XXIII, ENCYCLICAL PACEM IN TERRIS (1963, part III, paras. 80-81. See
JOHN FINNIS, JOSEPH M. BOYLE, JR. & JERMAIN GRISEZ, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY
AND REALISM 205 (Oxford U.P., 1987).
13. ENCYCLICAL LETTER VERITATIS SPLENDOR REGARDING CERTAIN FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTIONS OF THE CHURCH'S MORAL TEACHING, dated 6 August 1993, sec. 115. The
treatment of inviolable human rights, based on the moral norms exceptionlessly prohibiting
intrincally evil kinds of act centres on secs. 95-101.
14. FINNIS, BOYLE & GRISEz, supra note 12.
15. JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES: TRADITION, REVISION AND TRUTH (Catholic
University of America Press, Washington DC, 1991), especially pp. 1-83.
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Mt. 19:19)--constitute the indispensable rules of all social life."16 In
my paper in Robert George's recent collection Natural Law Theory, 7 I
make a similar claim about the backbone of the legal system being the
exceptionless norms which exclude intentionally killing the innocent,
intentionally harming, lying, and so forth, and in Moral Absolutes I say
what I know about the place of the Ten Commandments in the
Christian dispensation. Here I shall say no more about this very
important matter.
III.
The government of political communities is rationally limited, not
only (1) by constitutional law and (2) by the moral norms which limit
every decent person's deliberation and choice, but also (3) by the
inherent limits of its general justifying aim, purpose or rationale. That
rationale I follow the tradition of natural law theory in calling the
"common gobd" of the political community. And that common good is not
basic, intrinsic or constitutive, but rather is instrumental. This is
something which I have not made clear in my published reflections on
natural law theory. How should it be explained? Every community is
constituted by the communication and cooperation between its members.
To say that a community has a common good is simply to say that that
communication and cooperation has a point which the members more or
less concur in understanding, valuing and pursuing. How does a critical
political theory go about identifying, explaining and showing to be fully
reasonable the various types of intelligible point or common good, and
thus the various fully reasonable types of human community? It can do
so only by going back to first principles. And the first principles of all
deliberation, choice and action are the basic reasons for action. What
gives reason for action is always some intelligible benefit which could be
attained or instantiated by successful action, benefits such as the
followng seven. Each is a basic, irreducible form of human opportunity,
good for its own sake. There is (1) knowledge (including aesthetic
appreciation) of reality; (2) skillful performance, in work and play, for its
own sake; (3) bodily life and the component aspects of its fullness:
health, vigour and safety; (4) friendship or harmony and association
between persons in its various forms and strengths; (5) the sexual
association of a man and a woman which, though it essentially involves
both friendship between the partners and the procreation and education
16. VERITATiS SPLENDOR § 97.
17. NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL REASONING in NATURAL LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY
ESSAYS 134-57 (Robert P. George ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992).
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of children by them, seems to have a point and shared benefit that is
irreducible either to friendship or to life-in-its-transmission and
therefore (as comparative anthropology confirms and Aristotle came
particularly close to articulating,"8 not to mention the "third founder"
of Stoicism, Musonius Rufus) should be acknowledged to be a distinct
basic human good, call it marriage; (6) the good of harmony between
one's feelings and one's judgments (inner integrity), and between one's
judgments and one's behavior (authenticity), which we can call practical
reasonableness, and lastly (7) harmony with the widest reaches and most
ultimate source of all reality, including meaning and value. The
propositions that pick out such basic human goods precisely as giving
(underived, non-instrumental) reason for action to instantiate those
goods, and for avoiding what threatens to destroy, damage or impede
their instantiation, are propositions called by Aquinas the first principles
of natural law or natural right'--natural, not because they are
principles deduced from some prior theoretical account of human nature,
but rather because precisely by one's originally practical understanding
of these aspects of human flourishing and fulfillment, one comes both to
realize (make actual in practice) and reflectively and theoretically to
understand the nature of the sort of being (the human person, homo)
who is fulfilled in these ways.20 With all this in mind, let me go back
to the question of the basic types of common good and human communi-
ty. There are three types of common good which each provide the
18. Everyone knows and few even profess to deny Aristotle's teaching that peoply are
by nature social and indeed political animals. Many fewer seem aware of his teaching
(NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VIII 12: 1162a15-29) that people are by nature even more primarily
conjugal.
19. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q.94 aa.2c, 3c.
20. On the fundamental but often overlooked Aristotelian and Thomistic methodological
axiom, that natures are understood by understanding capacities, and capacities by
understanding their actuations, and acts by understanding their objects (and on the basic
human goods as the objects of acts of will), see JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS,
21-22 (Georgetown U.P., 1983). A further methodological note may be in place. Although
the worth of all these types of intrinsic benefit, of basic human good, is obvious, a reflective
account of them can and should be discursive and critical, assembling reminders of the
experience, practices and institutions which evidence the intelligibility and point of these
forms of good, and defending the account against doubts and objections. For the inherent
self-evidence of some propositions does not preclude a rational defence of them; one argues
for such a proposition dialectically, i.e. by relating it to other knowledge, and showing that
denying it had rationally unacceptable consequences. Once again one can observe that
when Strauss wrote, this work of argumentation and critical dialectic had been only
patchily begun; but since then it has been essayed quite vigorously. See JERMAIN GRISEZ,
JOSEPH M. BOYLE & JOHN FINNIS, "PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES, MORAL TRUTH AND ULTIMATE
ENDS" American J. Jurisprudence 32,99-148 (1987) and bibliography at 14-151; Robert P.
George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, U. CHi.'L. REv. 55, 1371-1429 (1988).
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constitutive point of a distinctive type of open-ended community and
directly instantiate a basic human good: (i) the affectionate mutual help
and shared enjoyment of the friendship and communio of "real friends;"
(ii) the sharing of husband and wife in married life, united as comple-
mentary, bodily persons whose activities make them apt for parent-
hood-the communio of spouses and, if their marriage is fruitful, their
children; (iii) the communio of religious believers cooperating in the
devotion and service called for by what they believe to be the accessible
truths about the ultimate source of meaning, value and other realities,
and about the ways in which human beings can be in harmony with that
ultimate source. Other human communities either are dedicated to
accomplishing a specific goal or set of goals (like a university or hospital)
and so are not in the open-ended service of their members, or have a
common good that is instrumental rather than basic. One should notice
that association and cooperation, even when oriented towards goals that
are both specific and instrumentally rather than basically and intrinsi-
cally good (as, e.g., in a business enterprise), have a more than merely
instrumental character in as much as they instantiate the basic good of
friendship in one or other of its central or non-central forms.
Thus, the political communityw-properly understood as one of the
forms of collaboration needed for the sake of the goods identified in the
first principles of natural law-is a community cooperating in the service
of a common good that is instrumental, not itself basic. True, it is a
good that is great and godlike21 in its ambitious range: "to secure the
whole ensemble of material and other conditions, including forms of
collaboration, that tend to favour, facilitate, and foster the realization by
each individual [in that community] of his or her personal develop-
ment"' (which will in each case include, constitutively, the flourishing
of the family, friendship and other communities to which that person
belongs). True too, its proper range includes the regulation of friend-
ships, marriage, families, and religious associations, as well as of all the
many organizations and associations which, like the state itself, have
only an instrumental (e.g. an economic) common good. But such
regulation, of these associations should never (in the case of the
21. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs Il: 1094b9.
22. JoHN FINNLs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 147. As I indicate, ibid. p.160,
this account of the common good of the political community is close to that worked out by
French commentators on Aquinas in the early mid-twentieth century. A similar account
was adopted by the Second Vatican Council: e.g. "the sum of those conditions of social life
which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready
access to their own fulfillment" (GAUDIUM ET SPES (1965) para. 26; similarly DIGNITATIS
HUMANAE (1965) para. 6).
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associations with a non-instrumental common good) or only exceptionally
(in the case of instrumental associations) be intended to take over the
formation, direction or management of these personal initiatives and
interpersonal associations. Rather, its purpose must be to carry out a
function that the theologians of the early twentieth century taught
European politicians and treaty drafstmen of the 1990s to call subsidiary
(i.e. helping, from the Latin subsidium, help)-the functions of
assisting individuals and groups to coordinate their activities for the
objectives and commitments they have chosen, and to do so in ways
consistent with the other aspects of the common good of this community,
uniquely complex and far-reaching in its rationale and peculiarly
demanding in its requirements of cooperation, the political communi-
ty.2
The fundamentally instrumental character of the political common
good is indicated by both parts of the teaching about religious liberty by
the Second Vatican Council, the great assembly of Catholic bishops from
1962 to 1965. The Council considered its teaching to be a matter of
natural law (i.e. of "reason itself").'s The first part of the teaching is
that everyone has the right not to be coerced in matters of religious
belief and practice. For to know the truth about the ultimate matters
compendiously called by the Council "religious," and to adhere to and put
into practice the truth one has come to know, is so significant a good and
so basic a responsibility, and the attainment of that "good of the human
spirit726 is so inherently and non-substitutably a matter of personal
assent and conscientious decision, that if a government intervenes
coercively in people's search for true religious beliefs, or in people's
expression of the beliefs they suppose true, it will harm those people and
23. See FINNIS, supra note 22, at 146-47, 159.
24. Of course, the common good of the political community has important elements
which are scarcely shared with any other community within the polity: for example, the
restoration of justice by punishment of those who have offended against just laws; the
coercive repelling and restraint of those whose conduct (including negligent omissions)
unfairly threatens the interests of others, particularly those interests identified as moral
("human") or legal rights, and corresponding compulsory measures to secure restitution,
compensation or reparation for violations of rights; the specifying and upholding of a
system of holding or property rights which respects the various interests, immediate and
vested or remote and contingent, which everyone has in each holding. But the fact that
these and various other elements of the political common good are peculiar to the political
community and the proper responsibility of its leaders, the government, in no way entails
that these elements are basic human goods or that the political common good is other than
in itself instrumental.
25. DECLARATION DIGNITATIS HuMANAE, para. 2. The Council considered it to be also
a matter of divine revelation.
26. It is one of the animi humani bona mentioned in ibid., para.1.
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violate their dignity even when its intervention is based on the correct
premise that their search has been negligently conducted or has led
them into false beliefs or both. Religious acts, according to the Council,
"transcend" the sphere which is proper to government; government is to
care for the temporal common good, and this includes the subsidiary
function of acknowledging and fostering the religious life of its citizens;
but governments have no responsibility or right to direct religious acts,
and "exceed their proper limits" if they presume t. do so.7
The second part of the Council's teaching concerns the proper
restrictions on religious freedom, namely those restrictions
required for [i] the effective protection of the rights of all citizens and
of their peaceful coexistence, [ii] a sufficient care for the authentic
public peace of an ordered common life in true justice, and [iii] a proper
upholding ofpublic morality. All these factors constitute the fundamen-
tal part of the common good, and come under the notion of ordre
public.'
Here, too, the political common good is presented as instrumental,
serving the protection of human and legal rights, public peace and public
morality-in other words, the preservation of a social environment
conducive to virtue. Government is precisely not presented here as
dedicated to the promotion of virtue and the repression of vice, even
though virtue (and vice) are of supreme and constitutive importance for
the well-being (or otherwise) of individual persons and the worth (or
otherwise) of their associations.
Is the Vatican Council's natural law theory right? Or should we
rather adhere to the uncomplicated teaching of Aquinas's treatise On
Princely Government, that government should command whatever leads
people towards their ultimate (heavenly) end, forbid whatever deflects
them from it, and coercively deter people from evil-doing and induce
them to morally decent conduct?29 Perhaps the most persuasive short
statement of that teaching is still Aristotle's famous attack on theories
which like the sophist Lycophron's, treat the state as a mere mutual
27. "Potestas igitur civilis, cuius finis proprius est bonum commune temporale curare,
religiosam quidem civium vitam agnoscere eique favere debet, sed limites suos excedere
dicenda est, si actus religiosos dirigere vel impedire praesumat": ibid., para.3.
28. Ibid., para.7.
29. DE REGIMINE PRINCIPUM c.14 (... ab iniquitate coerceat et ad opera virtuosa
inducat). This thesis is qualified, though not abandoned, in other works of Aquinas. Thus
SUMMA THEOLOGAE I-Il q.104 a.5c teaches that human government has no authority over
people's minds and the interior motions of their wills. Ibid. I-I q.96 a.2 teaches that
governmental pursuit of virtue should be gradual and should not ask too much of the
average citizen (who is not virtuous).
1994] 695
MERCER LAW REVIEW
insurance arrangement? 0  But in two crucial respects, at least,
Aristotle (and with him the tradition) has taken things too easily. First:
if the object, point or common good of the political community were
indeed a self-sufficient life, and if self-sufficiency (autarcheia) were
indeed what Aristotle defines it to be-a life lacking in nothing, one of
complete fulfillment-then we would have to say that the political
community has a point it cannot hope to achieve, a common good utterly
beyond its reach. For subsequent philosophical reflection has confirmed
what one might suspect from Aristotle's own manifest oscillation
between different conceptions of eudaimonia (and thus of autarcheia),
that integral human fulfillment is nothing less than the fulfillment of (in
principle), all human persons in all communities and cannot be achieved
in any community short of the heavenly kingdom, a community
envisaged not by unaided reason (natural law theory) but only by virtue
of divine revelation and attainable only by supernatural divine gift. To
be sure, integral human fulfillment can and should be a conception
central to a natural law theory of morality and thus of politics. For
nothing less than integral human fulfillment, the fulfillment of all
persons in all the basic human goods, answers to reason's full knowledge
of, and the will's full interest in, the human good in which one can
participate by action. And so the first principle of a sound morality
must be: In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is
opposed to them, one ought to choose and will those and only those
possibilities whose willing is compatible with integral human fulfillment.
To say that immorality is constituted by cutting back on, fettering,
30. ... the polis was formed not for the sake of life only but rather for the good life...
and ... its purpose is not [merely] military alliance for defence... and it does not exist
[merely] for the sake of trade and business relations.., any polis which is truly so called,
and is not one merely in name, must have virtue/excellence as an object of its care [peri
aretes epimeles einai: be sollicitous about virtue]. Otherwise a polis sinks into a mere
alliance, differing only in space from other forms of alliance where the members live at a
distance from each other. Otherwise, too, the law becomes a mere social contract
[syntheke: covenant]--or (in the phrase of the sophist Lycophron) 'a guarantor of justice
as between one man and another'-instead of being, as it should be, such as will make
[poiein] the citizens good and just .... The polis is not merely a sharing of a common
locality for the purpose of preventing mutual injury and exchanging goods. These are
necessary preconditions of the existence of a polis... but a polis is a communio [koinonia]
of clans [and neighborhoods] in living well, with the object of a full and self-sufficient
[autarkous] life ... it must therefore be for the sake of truly good (kalon) actions, not of
merely living together... ARISTOTLE, POLITIcS 111.5: 1280a32, a35,1280b7-13, b30-31, b34,
1281a14.
31. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics I, 7:1097b. This, incidentally, differs widely from
what STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 215-17 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990), means
by "an autarchic person."
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reason by passions is equivalent to saying that the sway of feelings over
reason constitutes immorality by deflecting one to objectives not in line
with integral human fulfillment. This ideal community is thus the good
will's most fundamental orientating ideal, but it is not, as early natural
law theories such as Aristotle's prematurely proposed, the political
community.
Secondly: when Aristotle speaks of "making" people good, he constant-
ly 32 uses the word poiesis which he has so often contrasted with praxis
and reserved for techniques ("arts") of manipulating matter. But helping
citizens to choose and act in line with integral human fulfillment must
involve something which goes beyond any art or technique. For only
individual acting persons can by their own choices make themselves good
or evil. Not that their life should or can be individualistic; their
deliberating and choosing will be shaped, and helped or hindered, by the
language of their culture, by their family, their friends, their associates
and enemies, the customs of their communities, the laws of their polity,
and by the impress of human influences of many kinds from beyond
their homeland. Their choices will involve them in relationships just or
unjust, generous or illiberal, vengeful or charitable, with other persons
in all these communities. And as members of all these communities they
have some responsibility to encourage their fellow-members in morally
good and discourage them from morally bad conduct.
Tb be sure, the political community is a cooperation which undertakes
the unique tasks' of giving coercive protection to all individuals and
lawful associations within its domain, and of securing an economic and
cultural environment in which all these persons and groups can pursue
their own proper good. This common good of the political community
makes it far more than a mere arrangement for "preventing mutual
injury and exchanging goods." But it is one thing to maintain, as reason
requires, that the political community's rationale requires that its public
managing structure, the state, should deliberately and publicly identify,
encourage, facilitate, and support the truly worthwhile (including moral
virtue), should deliberately and publicly identify, discourage, and hinder
the harmful and evil, and should by its criminal prohibitions and
sanctions (as well as its other laws and policies) assist people with
parental responsibilities to educate children and young people in virtue
and to discourage their vices. It is another thing to maintain that
rationale requires or authorizes the state to direct people to virtue and
deter them from vice by making even secret and truly consensual adult
32. Apart from the passage just cited, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1,10:
1099b32; II,: 1103b4; X,9: 1180b24.
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acts of vice a punishable offense against the state's laws.3 There was
a sound and important distinction of principle which the Supreme Court
of the United States overlooked in moving from Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 US 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by spouses) to Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 US 438 (1970) (public distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried people)." The truth and relevance of that distinction would
be overlooked again if laws making sodomy between adults an offense
were to be struck down by the Court on any ground which would also
require the law to tolerate the advertising or marketing of homosexual
services, the maintenance of places of resort for homosexual activity, or
the promotion of homosexualist "lifestyles" via education and public
media of communication, or to recognize homosexual "marriages" or
permit the adoption of children by sexually active homosexuals, and so
forth.35
IV.
As I said at the beginning, it is a mistake of method to frame one's
political theory in terms of its "liberal" or "non-liberal" (or "(anti-)con-
servative" or "(non-)socialist" or "(anti-)capitalist") character. Fruitful
inquiry in political theory asks and debates whether specified principles,
norms, institutions, laws and practices are "sound," "true," "good,"
"reasonable," "decent," "just," "fair," "compatible with proper freedom,"
and the like-not whether they are liberal or incompatible with
"liberalism."36 Still, many who style their own thought liberal offer to
33. So a third way in which Aristotle takes things too easily is his slide, at NICOMA-
CHEAN ETHICS X.9:1180al-3, from upholding government's responsibility to assist or
substitute for the direct parental discipline of youth, to claiming that this responsibility
continues, and in the same direct coercive form, "to cover the whole of a lifetime, since most
people obey necessity rather than argument, and punishments rather than the sense of
what is truly worthwhile."
34. The law struck down in Griswold was the law forbidding use of contraceptives even
by the married persons; Griswold's conviction as an accessory to such use fell with the fall
of the substantive law against the principals in such use. Very different, in principle,
would have been a law directly forbidding Griswold's activities as a public promoter of
contraceptive information and supplies. If U.S. constitutional law fails to recognize such
distinctions, it shows its want of sound principle.
35. On the reasons for judging homosexual sex acts to be morally wrong, see John
Finnis, Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation," - NOTRE DAME L. REv. __ (1994).
36. Enquiries framed in the latter way enmesh the would-be theorist in the shifting
contingencies of political movements or programmes which, taken in their sequence since
the term "liberal" emerged in political use in the 1830's, having virtually nothing
significant in common and, as movements, no principle for identifying a central case of
focal sense. The only sensible way to deal with philosophical claims framed in terms of
liberalism, liberal political institutions, etc., is to treat them as rhetorical code for "sound,"
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identify limits on government which go beyond those I have sketched
above. So we can usefully ask whether these limits suggest a conception
of limited government which natural law theory would be wrong to reject
or overlook. One proposal is that government not constrain liberty on
the ground that one conception of what is good or right for individuals
is superior to another. This proposal has been put forward by the later
Rawls as appropriate for nearly-just, modern, constitutional democracies
such as he takes ours to be. But this same latter-day Rawls abstains
from claiming that his theory is true, valid, or sound; it is advanced
instead as suitable to ensure stability and social unity from one
generation to the next, by bringing about or maintaining an "overlapping
consensus" on certain constitutional principles (notably this one)." To
claim validity or truth for his theory, or the principles it promotes, would
(Rawls claims) violate the conditions of pluralism and (as other "liberals"
put it) "neutrality" and to move from the proper domain of political
theory and practice into the domain of private ideals and conceptions of
the good--from public reasons for action to private reasons. Ronald
Dworkin, on the other hand, has proposed that the requirement of
government neutrality between conceptions of good and bad ways of life
is an implication of a true political principle, that everyone is entitled to
equal concern and respect.
Rawls' refusal to offer any (further) justification for these principles
has attracted devastating criticism from Joseph Raz,3" and others.39
The essential point, in my opinion, is that any position like Rawls'
postulates or presupposes an untenable distinction between public and
private reasons for action, since, like Rawls, the position will admit that
in one's private deliberations, unlike public deliberations, one may and
doubtless should be motivated by a conception of good and bad lives, a
conception which one considers true. The untenability of this distinction
is evident. For every political actor/agent is a human person or at least,
in the case of the social acts of groups (states, corporations, teams...),
has no existence apart from the personal acts of the people who are the
group's leaders and/or other members. Each person's reasons for
choosing to perform some political act must be, or at least be based upon,
reasons which for that person are ultimate/basic (in need of no further
"true," "warranted," "just" or the like; one translates accordingly and carries on with the
consideration of the arguments on their merits.
37. See the expository discussion of Rawls in Joseph Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case
of Epistemic Diversity, PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 19, 3-46, at 12 (1990).
38. See supra note 37 (the article also effectively criticises analogous proposals made
by Thomas Nagel).
39. MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 53, 55, 60-64.
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rationally motivating and thus justifying reason); and these reasons
must all be consistent with the acting person's other reasons or
principles of action. For one's public acts are at the same time one's
private acts--they are part of one's one and only real life. One's
engagement in a "political" act must be not merely not logically
inconsistent with one's conception of a good and decent life; it must
actually be rationally motivated by that conception (which after all can
be nothing other than one's conception of what are good reasons for one's
acting). So one's "public" reasons for acting must also be one's "private"
reasons (though it does not follow that all one's reasons for action need
be "made public"). Moreover, political actions often have the gravest
consequences both for the actor and for others; so, the public reasons are
not good (adequate) reasons unless they justify the act, all the way
down-justify the actor in doing it. To postulate that political acts are
all to be done for reasons publicly undiscussable ("private ideals") is to
propose that the political order should refuse to offer its participants any
good (adequate) reason for participating in it or for accepting the
burdens of citizenship.
What about Ronald Dworkin's attempts to derive a constraint of
neutrality from the "principle of equal concern and respect?" Constrain-
ing people's actions on the basis that the conception of the good that if
done in good faith, those actions put into effect is a bad conception, may
manifest, not contempt, but rather a sense of the equal worth and
human dignity of those people; the outlawing of their conduct may be
based simply on the judgment that they have seriously misconceived,
and are engaged in degrading, human worth and dignity, including their
own personal worth and dignity along with that of others who may be
induced to share in or emulate their degradation. In no field of human
discourseor practice should one equate the judging persons who are
mistaken and who act upon that judgment, with despising those persons
or preferring those who share one's judgment." After 1980 Dworkin
revised his argument. Equality of concern and respect is violated, he
contended, whenever sacrifices or constraints are imposed on citizens in
virtue of an argument they could not accept without abandoning their
sense of their equal worth. For "no self-respecting person who believes
that a particular way to live is most valuable for him can accept that
this way of life is base or degrading."4' But this argument is as
impotent as its forerunners. To forbid people's preferred conduct does
not require them to "accept an argument." If they did accept the
argument on which the law is based, they would be accepting that their
40. See FINNIS, supra note 22, at 221-23.
41. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 206 (Harvard U.P., 1985).
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former preferences were indeed unworthy of them or, if they had always
recognized that, but had retained their preferences nonetheless, it would
amount to an acknowledgment that they had been unconscientious.
People can come to regret their previous views and conduct, so one must
not identify persons, and their worth as human beings, with their
current conception(s) of human good. In sum, either those whose
preferred conduct is legally proscribed come to accept the concept of
human worth on which the law is based, or they do not. If they do, there
is no injury to their self-respect; they realize that they were in error, and
may be glad of the assistance which compulsion lent to reform (ie. drug
addicts). If they do not come to accept the law's view, the law leaves
their self-respect unaffected; they will regard the law, rightly or wrongly,
as pitiably and damagingly mistaken in its conception of what is good for
them. They may profoundly resent the law. What they cannot
accurately think is that a law motivated by concern for the good, the
worth and the dignity of everyone without exception, does not treat them
as an equal.42 Dworkin has tried to move the argument along further.
A careful, fair, and decisive summation and critique of these develop-
ments can be found in Robert George's fine new book, Making Men
Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality.'
I now turn, instead, to a proposal more recent and more cautious than
either Rawls' or Dworkin's. Stephen Macedo rejects the claim that
liberal justice is neutral among human goods or ways of life." But
government should do nothing disrespectful of its subjects, and respect
for persons requires, he argues, that citizens be subjected to only
publicly justifiable constraint. "People may rightly be coerced by the
state only for certain limited reasons,4 5 namely, public reasons,
"reasons that all ought to be able to accept."46
Thus stated this limit is one which a natural law theorist will gladly
accept. Natural law theory is nothing other than the account of all the
reasons-for-action which people ought to be able to accept, precisely
because these are good, valid, and sound as reasons. But Macedo, here
following Rawls, proposes to interpret the limit differently: ... public
moral justification ... does not aim to identify what are simply the best
42. See John Finnis, Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, at 437-38 (1987).
43. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY
83-109 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993).
44. MAcEDo, LIBERAL VIRTUES 265.
45. Ibid., 263.
46. Ibid., 195; cf. 41: "that all reasonable people should be able to accept."
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reasons, where best is a function of only the quality of the reasons as
reasons leaving aside the constraints of wide accessibility.47
Now this is not a crude appeal to majority rule. It is intended as a
substantive principle, limiting government action even where a majority
support the action. For such a support is sometimes based not on
reasons but on respect for tradition or mere uncritical mores. In such a
case, despite the fact that a law or other governmental action has
majority support and is in truth supported by the best reasons, the limit
which Macedo proposes would be transgressed-and those subjected to
the law would be treated without due respect-if the reasons supporting
the action, though sound and true, involve "very difficult forms of
reasoning."4s The rational justification for the government's action
must be "accessible to people as we know them."49 But, he goes on, in
a natural law theory such as Aquinas's or the new classical theory of
Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, George and others, there is a gap between first
principles and specific moral norms such as we find in the Decalogue, a
logical space which must be filled by inferences some of which "require
a wisdom or reasonableness 'not found in everyone or even in most
people.'"5
0
So, Macedo concludes, relevant parts of the natural law, even if true,
or at least the inferences, even if sound, on which they depend, may be
"beyond the capacities of 'most people'" and therefore not proper grounds
for law.5'
But in fact these natural law theorists do not admit that the actual
norms of the Decalogue, or even the inferences on which they rationally
depend, are beyond the capacities of most people, or that they are
inaccessible, or that they cannot be appreciated by most people.
Throughout his work, Macedo ignores the distinction between native and
formed capacity, between faculty and competence-the fact that I both
do and do not have the capacity to speak Icelandic. And in each of the
passages which Macedo implicitly relies upon, Aquinas says that the
precepts of the Decalogue can be known from first principles with only
47. Ibid., 50.
48. Ibid., 46; also 48 ("excessivley subtle and complex forms of reasoning"), 63-64 ("too
complex to be widely understood, or otherwise incapable of being widely appreciated by
reasonable people").
49. Ibid., 43.
50. Ibid., 212; the internal quotation is from FINNIS, "PERSONAL INTEGRITY, SEXUAL
MORALITY AND RESPONSIBLE PARENTHOOD," RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA PERSONAL E LA
FAMIGLIA: ANTHROPOS (Now ANTHROPOTES) 1, 43 at 52 (1985), which in turn is citing and
summarizing AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II q.100 aa. 1c, 11c.
51. MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 212.
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a little reflection52 and even ordinary folk can make the inference to
them and See their point,' though it can happen that some people get
confused about them;"4 other moral norms, inferable from the precepts
of the Dec'alogue, are ones which are known (cognoscuntur)'5 by the
wise rather than by others, who, unlike the wise, do not diligently
consider the relevant circumstances.' So even on the face of the texts,
there is no admission that the moral principles of the Decalogue are
outside the domain of "public justification" and public "accessibility."57
I want to conclude by taking up one of the two main issues on which
Macedo brings his proposed limit to bear. Macedo argues that govern-
ments should limit their protection of the unborn by a "principled
moderation" which demands that those with the best case should "give
something" to those who have put up a "case that is very strong." For,
he says, "[tihere are.. .'many reasonable arguments on both sides of the
abortion debat... and it is easy to see how reasonable people can come
down on either side.... [Albortion ... seems to come down to a fairly
close call between two well-reasoned sets of arguments."'
But Macedo's proposal unreasonably assumes a dialectical symmetry
which in reality does not hold. For if the better case is that what the
abortions in dispute deliberately seek to kill are living human persons,
then, however "well reasoned" the contrary arguments may be, it will be
a grave wrong to the unborn that the right to deliberately kill them is
the "something" to be "given" away to show our "respect" for people who
had denied the reality of the unborn's existence, nature, and rights. But
if the better case were some contrary (what?), then the loss of "autono-
my" or "liberty" given away to honor the pro-life reasoners would involve
no deliberate assault on mothers but merely an extension of those
restrictions on intentionally destructive individual action which are the
52. AQUNAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE 1-1 q.100, a.3c: "modica consideratione."
53. a.llc: "quorum rationem statim quilibet, etiam popularis potest de facili videre."
54. a.llc: "circa huiusmodi contingit judicium humanum perverti."
55. a.3c.
56. a.lc "quas considerare diligenter non est cuiuslibet sed sapientum".
57. Admittedly, large numbers of people can get confused even about one or another
norm of the:Decalogue, as (Aquinas remarks) the Germans encountered by Julius Caesar
were morally confused about robbery. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-Il q.94 a.4c. The
conventions' of a culture, reinforced by self-interest and a habit of following some passion,
can obscure many people's understanding of a moral norm, deflecting rational inference by
alluring images and by sophistical objections and rationalizations engendered by
intelligence in the service of feeling. Moreover, what is principle and what conclusion, and
how they are related, can be outside the habits of reflection and powers of articulation of
many who nonetheless, given time and skilful dialectic, could be brought to a reflective and
articulate grasp of them.
58. MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES 72.
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very first duty of government and the very basis of the common good.
So there is no symmetry, and in this matter the responsibility of
governments is to reach the right answer.
Indeed, a government which attends strictly to the arguments and is
not distracted by the numbers and respectability of those who propose
them, will find that (apart from the question whether killing is intended
in cases where the pregnancy itself threatens the mother's life) the issue
is not even a close call. Pro-choice arguments on abortion, however
well-reasoned, nicely fit Macedo's description: arguments based on sheer
prejudice (in this case, rationalizing the self-preference of men and
women). They yield conclusions which, as he says about "racism" and
anti-Semitism, we should not wish to compromise with but should, as a
community, approach "with resoluteness rather than moderation." For
there are fundamental matters in which a sound theory of government
is indeed incompatible with limitations based on an appeal to "principled
moderation" rather than to truth.
